routinely cooperate by referring deals and people to each other, helping to put funding together through investment syndicates, providing introductions to suppliers or customers, and sharing their resources in other ways. Indeed, they may sometimes do so specifically to raise the cost of entry. For instance, by referring promising deals they cannot fund themselves to their friends, incumbent VCs may be able to reduce the time entrepreneurs spend searching for funding, with the result that entrants are less likely to see the deal flow (Inderst and Mueller (2004) ). Or they may refuse to join an entrant's syndicate, making it harder for the entrant to assemble funding for any deal that requires syndication, perhaps due to its size or risk profile.
If life as a VC is easier for those who are already members of the club, perhaps the most costeffective way to enter a VC market is to gain an incumbent's cooperation -in the form of access to the incumbent's information, expertise, or contacts -with a view to eventually gaining admission to the club. This raises two questions: What incentives does an incumbent have to cooperate with an entrant? And how will the other incumbents react?
The most obvious inducement an entrant can offer in return for cooperation in the target market is access to its home market. Thus, entry may involve an element of reciprocity. That benefits the cooperating incumbent but must be balanced against any negative reaction from the other incumbents. More formally, consider a group of incumbent VCs, each of which maximizes its profit while considering the effect of its actions on the behavior of the others. Individually, each VC chooses whether or not to cooperate with an entrant trying to break into the market. If an incumbent chooses to cooperate, it expects to be punished by the other incumbents. The resulting Nash equilibrium is a function of the expected severity of punishment. The harsher is expected punishment, the more likely it is that incumbents will refrain from helping entrants. An incumbent's dominant strategy then depends on the gain from dealing with an entrant (such as reciprocal access to the entrant's home market), the expected punishment (such as refusal to cooperate with the deviating VC for one or more periods), and (because coordinating punishment becomes harder the more incumbents there are) the number of incumbents.
While many forms of cooperation are not observable, it is possible to use data on syndication relationships to proxy for how interdependent incumbents have chosen to be. VC firms that are prone to sharing their investments with other incumbents presumably also share other network resources.
1 All else equal, we expect more densely networked markets to be harder to enter, not only because of the relatively greater network externalities that incumbents (but not entrants) enjoy in such markets, but also because withdrawal of network access ('suspension from the club') may provide an effective threat of punishment against the offender.
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Using several distinct sources of identification, our results are consistent with the hypothesis that venture capitalists tacitly collude with a view to reducing entry. First, we find that there is less entry in VC markets in which incumbents are more tightly networked with each other, as evidenced by their past syndication patterns. The magnitude of the effect is large: Controlling for other likely determinants of market entry, a one-standard deviation increase in the extent to which incumbents are networked (using measures borrowed from economic sociology) reduces the number of entrants in the median market by more than a third.
The networking patterns we observe in the data may not be exogenous; rather, they may reflect strategic decisions incumbents make, presumably partly with a view to deterring entry.
For instance, where the threat of entry is higher, incumbents may strategically share information and deal flow, to keep entrants out. To correct for this potential endogeneity problem, we follow two approaches. First, we use instrumental variables motivated by non-strategic and mechanical determinants of syndication decisions. This strengthens our results, but in the absence of a natural experiment, concerns about the instruments are irrefutable.
Our second approach links observed networking at the level of a market to the entry decision of an individual potential entrant. This "mismatch" of the units of analysis lessens the impact of endogeneity, because it is hard(er) to argue that incumbents make their networking choices with respect to any individual potential entrant. For the purpose of an individual VC's entry decision, observed networking can hence reasonably be taken to be predetermined.
When we estimate the probability of a potential entrant successfully entering a market, we find, as in the market-level analysis, that strong networks among the incumbents in the target market reduce the likelihood of entry. This increases our confidence that networking truly affects entry decisions, in a causal fashion. But not every potential entrant is deterred. Controlling for geographic proximity to the target market and prior experience in the industry (which each double the likelihood of entry), we find that a potential entrant is significantly more likely to enter if it has previously established ties to incumbents through inviting them into syndicates in its own home market. Moreover, it is with these very same incumbents that the entrant does business in the target market. In the context of our entry deterrence game, this suggests that incumbents deviate from the strategy of non-cooperation with entrants when the gain from deviating -reciprocal access to the entrant's home market -is sufficiently tempting.
Finally, we examine the price effect of reduced entry by comparing the valuations of companies receiving VC funding in relatively more protected and relatively more open markets.
Controlling as best we can for other value drivers, we find that valuations are significantly lower in more densely networked markets: A one-standard deviation increase in our networking measures is associated with an around 10% decrease in valuation, from the mean of $25.6
million. This indicates that incumbent VCs benefit from reduced entry through paying lower prices for their investments. On the other hand, the more market share entrants can capture, the higher are the valuations paid in a market in the following year, suggesting that entry is procompetitive and, at least in that sense, benefits entrepreneurs.
Our contribution is threefold. First, we provide evidence that networking can have the effect of reducing entry in the VC market. We believe that our results may generalize to other industries that make heavy use of networks, such as investment banking. Second, our results help explain prior empirical evidence that better networked VCs enjoy better performance (see Hochberg, Ljungqvist, and Lu (2007) ). Part of the explanation for this may be due to the lower prices VCs pay for their investments in more densely networked markets. Third, we shed light on the process of entry in the VC industry. Successful entry appears to involve "joining the club" by offering the incumbents syndication opportunities in one's home market. This is interesting in light of Lerner's (1994) observation that "the process through which some of the entrants joined the core of established venture organizations remains unclear."
I. Literature Review
Our work is closely related to the industrial organization literature on entry. Though there has been little empirical analysis of entry in response to the activities of incumbents, there is a rich literature focusing on the activities of entrants. Relevant contributions include Reiss (1987, 1991) who estimate an equilibrium entry model applied to a sample of firms in isolated markets, but do not consider differences among firms; and Berry (1992) who examines a model of entry in the airline industry that considers the effect of the scale of an airline's operations at an airport on the profitability of routes it flies from there. Berry's model expressly focuses on firm heterogeneity. Our work combines an entry model which allows for differences among firms with an examination of how network ties among incumbents can serve as a barrier to entry and how network ties between potential entrants and incumbents can facilitate entry.
This paper is also related to a large literature examining the economic effects of networks. Saxenian (1994) examines the role of informal ties and network-like organizations among engineers in Silicon Valley's success. Powell, Koput, and Smith-Doerr (1996) examine similar network ties in the biotechnology industry. Belleflame and Bloch (2004) model the formation of networks of market-sharing collusive relationships among firms, focusing on agents' decisions whether to build and maintain a link, and which networks will emerge in equilibrium.
Finally, our paper is related to the literature examining the structure and organization of the venture capital industry. Sahlman (1990) examines the governance of VC firms with particular focus on the investor-fund manager relationship. Lerner (1994) and Brander, Amit, and Antweiler (2002) study the motivations for syndication among venture capitalists. Hochberg, Ljungqvist, and Lu (2007) examine the impact of syndication networks on VC performance.
II. Sample and Data
Most of our data comes from Thomson Financial's Venture Economics (VE) database. We consider all investments in U.S. companies made by U.S. based VC funds between 1975 and 2003 that are included in the VE database. We exclude investments by angels and buyout funds. Sorenson and Stuart (2001) show that VCs tend to specialize in a certain industry and to invest locally, not least because VC investments require substantial monitoring and active management. Thus, the VC industry appears to be segmented into industry-specific, localized markets. We use the six broad industry groups defined by Venture Economics 3 and cross each with either states or metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs), giving two alternative market definitions. States usually cover larger geographic areas, resulting in a broader market definition, while MSAs can usefully aggregate economic activity across borders (e.g., the tristate area around New York City). In practice, our results are nearly identical using either definition.
A. Market Definitions
For inclusion in the sample, a market-year must have a history of at least 25 investments in the prior five years (to exclude markets with no real history of VC investment) and at least five VC deals in the year of analysis (to exclude inactive markets). This results in 129 distinct state/industry markets and 130 distinct MSA/industry markets. Our panels have between one and 24 annual observations for each market. The total number of market-years is 1,364 using states and 1,268 using MSAs.
B. Incumbents and Entrants
We define incumbents as VC firms that have invested in the target market at some time prior to year t and continue to have investments in the market as of year t. Entrants are defined as VC firms that invest in the market for the first time in year t. 4 Entrants are not necessarily inexperienced "rookies"; for the most part, they are themselves incumbents in other markets, and they may well be more experienced than the marginal incumbent in the target market.
To measure the extent of entry in a market in year t, we code four variables:
(a) the number of deals lead-managed by entrants in the market; 5 3 Of the 19,012 portfolio companies in the sample, 40.6% are "Computer related", 25.3% are "Non-hightechnology," 15.4% are "Communications and media," 9.4% are "Medical, health, life sciences," 5.4% are "Semiconductors, other electronics," and 3.8% are "Biotechnology." 4 For robustness purposes, we also consider as entrants firms for which some amount of time has passed since their last investment in a market. Our results are robust to considering a range of time limits on prior investment history. 5 In common with the VC literature, a deal is defined as a collection of investments in a given portfolio company in a specific round of financing. We identify the lead as the investor making the largest investment in the round.
(b) the number of entrants in the market;
(c) the number of entrants that lead-manage deals in the market; and (d) the fraction of deals lead-managed by entrants in the market. incumbents and nine entrants, five of which enter by leading syndicates for one deal each, giving a combined market share of 28.6%. In the median MSA-market-year, there are 16 incumbents and eight entrants, four of which enter leading one deal each with a market share of 25%.
C. Market-level Network Measures
Social network analysis provides a convenient way to measure how interconnected incumbents are in a market. 6 Consider the markets shown in Figures 1 and 2 . Figure 1 Networks can be represented in matrix form. Cells reflect whether two VCs co-invested in 6 See Wasserman and Faust (1997) for a detailed review of network analysis methods. See Hochberg, Ljungqvist, and Lu (2007) for an application to venture capital. 7 Venture Economics distinguishes between VC funds and management firms. A VC fund has a limited (usually tenyear) life, so we assume relationships reside at the level of the VC firm.
the same portfolio company, and can be coded in one of two ways. 8 The "undirected" matrix records as a tie any participation by both VC firms i and j in a syndicate. The "directed" matrix differentiates between syndicates led by VC i versus those led by VC j. 9 (Figures 1 and 2 illustrate directed networks.) A natural measure of how interconnected incumbents are is the proportion of all logically possible ties that are actually present in their market, called density.
For example, the maximum number of undirected ties among three incumbents A, B, and C is three -everyone is tied to everyone else. If only A and C are connected to each other, the density is 1/3 (one tie out of the three possible).
Formally, in an undirected network of n actors, the number of logically possible ties is ½n(n-1); in a directed network, it is n(n-1). Let p ijm =1 if at least one syndication relationship exists between VCs i and j in market m, and zero otherwise. Then the density of the undirected network equals Σ j Σ i p ijm / (n(n-1)). Let q ijm =1 if at least one syndication relationship exists in market m in which VC i was the lead investor and VC j was a syndicate member, and zero otherwise. The density of the directed network then equals Σ j Σ i q ijm / (n(n-1)).
In common with the industrial organization literature, we focus on relationships among the dominant incumbents and ignore ties among the competitive fringe, reasoning that the latter do not reflect an attempt to deter entry. We classify an incumbent as dominant if the VC firm is among the group of firms that contribute the first 80% of invested dollars in the target market measured over the prior five-year window; our results are not sensitive to this choice of cut-off.
VC firms that enter a market eventually become incumbents. To capture this dynamic, we construct a new network for each market for each year t, using data on syndications among the incumbents over the five years ending in t-1. 10 Table I , Panel B reports descriptive statistics. The density of directed and undirected ties in the average state/industry market is 2.1% and 7.8% of its theoretical maximum, respectively (densities computed for MSA/industry pairs are somewhat larger). To illustrate, the Massachusetts biotech industry typifies a densely networked market; it ranks among the highest symmetric-density markets in every year in our panel. The New York non-high-tech industry, on the other hand, is the least densely networked market in most years.
D. Market Characteristics
The level of entry we observe in the data is an equilibrium outcome of the interaction of the potential demand for and the potential supply of VC capital. Both are difficult to observe and hence challenging to measure. To proxy for demand and supply factors that affect the entry decision, our models include a range of controls, summarized in Table I , Panel C.
Better investment performance in a particular target market may attract entrants. Absent data on investment returns, we follow Hochberg, Ljungqvist, and Lu (2007) and compute the fraction of incumbent portfolio companies in a market that were successfully exited through an IPO or an M&A transaction between t-5 and t-1. We then compute the target market's excess exit rate as the market exit rate relative to the median exit rate across all markets in the same industry in that five-year window. This averages 4.7% in state markets and 15.1% in MSA markets.
Markets with more volatile deal flow may provide more opportunity for entry if incumbents cannot easily meet unexpected increases in demand. To proxy for swings in market demand, we compute the coefficient of variation of the monthly number of deals over the prior five years.
The average market has a coefficient of variation of 1. Investment opportunities are a reasonable proxy for a demand-side factor affecting entry.
Controlling for investment opportunities in a private market is not easy. We follow Gompers and Lerner (2000a) who use public-market pricing multiples as a proxy for private-market investment
climates. Specifically, we construct annual book-to-market ratios from Compustat data for each of the six Venture Economics industries. The mean value-weighted industry book-to-market ratio in our data is around 0.5. This variable varies by year and industry but not by state or MSA.
11 Larger states tend to have more MSAs and so are overweighted in this particular summary statistic.
If VC firms raise funds in response to perceived investment opportunities in a particular industry, fund inflows are another useful proxy for the industry investment climate. VC fund inflows average around $7 billion per year and industry over the sample period.
Many start-up companies develop and commercialize cutting-edge technologies, and so require skilled and educated workers. Education levels in a particular geographic region may hence be related to the probability of entrepreneurial success and consequently to the supply of VC funding. We obtain data on annual state-level science and engineering degree completions from the National Science Foundation (NSF). 12 This averages 2.6 per a thousand inhabitants.
E. Characteristics of Potential Entrants
All else equal, we expect more entry if there is a larger pool of "qualified" potential entrants (see Berry (1992) ). A VC firm is considered to be a potential entrant if (1) it was founded in or before year t; (2) it has at least one fund under management that was raised in the previous six years; and (3) it has not invested in this particular market prior to year t. 13 We consider three key characteristics of potential entrants.
VC investments require substantial monitoring and active management and so tend to be local. We therefore control for the geographic distance between each potential entrant's location and the target market. Following Coval and Moskowitz (1999) , we compute the geographic distance for each pair of VC i and target market m as follows:
12 Science and engineering includes the following subjects: Engineering, physical sciences, geosciences, mathematics and computer sciences, life sciences, and science and engineering technologies. 13 Condition (2) ensures that we capture active funds. A typical VC fund spends its first few years nurturing portfolio companies and the remainder of its life exiting them (Ljungqvist and Richardson (2005) ).
where lat and lon are the latitudes and longitudes (measured in degrees of arc) and r is the radius of the earth ( ≈ 3,963 miles). 14 We then compute the fraction of potential entrants that are located within 100 miles of the target market. (Our results are robust to alternative cut-offs.)
Presumably, prior investment experience in the industry or state/MSA help a potential entrant enter a market. Thus, we assign potential entrants to four groups based on their industry and geographic investment patterns in the prior five years. In the mean state market, 6.8% of potential entrants have previously invested in both the industry and state, 31% have invested in the industry before but not in the state, 5.9% have invested in the state but not in the industry, and the remainder in neither. Figures for MSA markets are similar; see Table I , Panel D.
A key question we address is whether an entrant's prior relationships with incumbents, established in other markets, can facilitate entry. For each potential entrant, we generate indicator variables capturing whether, in the prior five years, the potential entrant (a) participated in a deal lead-managed by an incumbent; or (b) lead-managed a deal in another market in which an incumbent was a co-investor. In the jargon of network analysis, these correspond to positive indegree and outdegree, respectively. In the average market-year, around 20% of potential entrants have served as co-investors for incumbents elsewhere during the prior five years, while around 13% have lead-managed syndicates in which incumbents were co-investors.
III. Market-Level Analysis

A. A Descriptive Model of Entry in Venture Capital
To see if the data support a link between the extent of entry in a VC market and the density of the incumbents' network ties, we regress the number of deals entrants win in year t in market m on the networking measure for the market as of year t-1 and suitably lagged controls for the pool of qualified potential entrants and the aforementioned market characteristics. We have two alternative network measures (asymmetric and symmetric density) and two alternative market definitions (using states and MSAs), resulting in four specifications. 15 Given the count nature of the dependent variable, and the fact that we have repeated observations per market, the models are estimated using conditional fixed-effects Poisson. We also include year fixed effects. Table II reports the resulting estimates. The pseudo-R 2 exceeds 50% indicating good explanatory power. In each of the four specifications, we find a strongly negative and significant relation between the extent of networking and the number of deals entrants win, consistent with our conjecture that networking can help deter entry. As we control separately for whether deals are typically syndicated in the market, networking likely captures more than a straightforward refusal to syndicate a deal with an entrant.
The controls behave as expected. There is significantly more entry if there is a larger pool of qualified potential entrants for the market, in the sense of geographic proximity to the market or prior investment experience (especially having invested both in the area and the industry). 16 A greater prevalence of past network ties between potential entrants and incumbents also makes entry more likely, giving a first indication that entry indeed involves a measure of reciprocity: By sharing its deal flow today, a VC firm may gain access to another market at a later date.
As for the market characteristics, as expected, the number of deals entrants win increases in investment opportunities (as proxied by industry book-to-market ratios), variability of demand, flows of capital into the industry, and the size of the VC market (as measured by the number of 15 In a previous draft, we included two further popular network measures, namely "degree" and "eigenvector", with qualitatively similar results (available on request). 16 Sensibly, experience in the state or MSA by VCs focused on other industries is associated with less entry. deals in the previous year). There is less entry in larger states (based on state GSP) and (using the MSA definition) in states with more science and engineering graduates. Entry is unrelated to the market's lagged performance history, the number of incumbents, and GSP growth.
B. Causality
The results in Table II provide clear evidence of a link between the extent of entry in a VC market and the density of the incumbents' network ties, but is it causal? This is a tough question to answer, given the (strong) possibility that networking is endogenous to entry. If entry deterrence is indeed strategic, we should think of incumbents as optimizing their investment in networking in part with a view to minimizing entry. This could result in a spurious correlation.
To better understand whether there is indeed a causal link, we take two approaches. The first uses instrumental variables to deal directly with the potential endogeneity of networking; this is discussed in the remainder of this section. The second approach links observed networking at the level of a market to entry decisions at the level of a potential entrant (in Section IV) or to the valuations at which entrepreneurial companies raise venture money (in Section V). Changing the unit of observation in this way should lessen the impact of endogeneity, because it is hard(er) to argue that incumbents optimize networking with respect to an individual potential entrant or an individual funding round. This is a standard way to circumvent endogeneity concerns (see Bottazzi, da Rin, and Hellmann (2006) for a recent application to the VC setting).
C. A Two-stage Model of Market-level Entry
For our first approach, we use two instruments chosen to satisfy the standard IV exclusion restriction; that is, the instruments likely correlate with the extent of networking in a market but are unlikely to affect entry directly.
C.1. Geographic Clustering of Demand
If more frequent interaction helps VCs form ties, it is more likely that dense networks will result. Markets in which demand is spread uniformly over a wide geographic area presumably offer fewer opportunities for VCs to interact than markets in which demand is concentrated in a few clusters of economic activity. Silicon Valley is an obvious case in point. More generally, VCs tend to meet while in town to attend board meetings of their portfolio companies (Kuemmerle and Ellis (1999) ) and during "pitch events" for local startups seeking capital. The more clustered are portfolio companies and start-ups, the greater the chances that any two VCs will meet and establish a relationship. Thus, our first instrument is based on the geographic distribution of demand in a market, measured as the coefficient of variation of the distance between each pair of portfolio companies in a market, calculated using equation (1) above.
C.2. Presence of Corporate VCs
For reasons unrelated to entry considerations, markets with a heavy presence of corporate venture programs are likely to be less densely networked. According to Gompers and Lerner (2000b) , corporate VCs differ from traditional VCs both in terms of investment objectives (which are often strategic rather than financial) and their longevity (which averages a mere four years). This alone makes them less likely to view networking as a way to reduce long-run entry into a given market: It may be something they are content to free-ride on, but their incentives to contribute to entry deterrence -for instance, by carrying out costly punishment strategies -are clearly much lower. Corporate VCs also tend to form less dense syndication networks, for a simple reason. Because of compensation issues, they are typically staffed with managers seconded from the parent corporation, as opposed to dedicated venture capital professionals (Gompers and Lerner (2001) ). These individuals are likely to be considerably less well networked (at the personal level) than are dedicated VC professionals, and this tends to lead to opportunistic as opposed to strategic syndication.
Thus, the presence of corporate VCs in a market is expected to be associated with lower levels of networking, a prediction borne out empirically in Zheng (2004) . At the same time, it is hard to see why the presence of corporate VCs should encourage or deter entry directly.
C.3. First-stage Results
The first-stage regression in our IV models predicts the extent of networking in the market as a function of the two instruments, the second-stage control variables (as per Table II) , and market and year fixed effects. Table III reports the estimates for each of the four specifications.
Overall, the models appear to be well specified: The within-group R 2 in each exceeds 50%.
Having valid instruments that satisfy the exclusion restriction is not sufficient to ensure unbiased two-stage estimators in finite samples; the instruments also need to correlate 'strongly'
with the endogenous first-stage variable. The F-tests suggest our instruments are collectively strong in all four models, using Staiger and Stock's (1997) recommended critical value of 10.
Consistent with our hypothesis that markets in which demand is concentrated geographically experience more networking, we find that the coefficient of variation of within-market pairwise distances among portfolio companies is negatively and significantly related to both density measures under both market definitions. The same is true of the fraction of corporate VCs in a market (except when we model symmetric density in MSA markets).
C.4. Determinants of Market Entry: Second-stage Results
Table IV presents the results of the instrumental-variables models. The dependent variables in Panels A, B, and C are the number of deals won by new entrants in year t, the number of VC firms entering a market, and the number of VCs entering as lead-managers, respectively. As in estimate fractional logit models using quasi-MLE, modeling the conditional mean as E(y|x)=exp(xβ)/(1+exp(xβ)); see Papke and Wooldridge (1996) . As fractional logits cannot currently accommodate fixed effects, Panel D pools repeated observations on each market. To conserve space, we report only the coefficients for the instrumented network measures and the R 2 ; the coefficients on the controls mirror those shown in Table II .
As before, we find a negative and statistically significant relation between networking and the number of deals won by entrants. 18 Comparing Table II to Panel A of Table IV , it is clear that failure to account for endogeneity imparts a positive (i.e., attenuating) bias to the coefficient estimates. The economic effect of networking is large. At the sample means of the other covariates, a one-standard deviation increase in asymmetric density, for instance, reduces the expected number of deals entrants win in state markets in Panel A by 1.8. This is large compared to the median, which is five. The predicted difference in the number of deals won in the most and least networked markets is -11.3. (In general, the economic effects are a little smaller when we consider MSA markets. For instance, in Panel A, the corresponding number for the two MSA specifications is around -5.) Networking has the third largest economic effect in this specification, after variation in investment opportunities and state GSP.
Similar results obtain for the other three measures of entry. Both the overall number of entrants and the number of entrants that lead syndicates are negatively and significantly related 17 We obtain qualitatively similar results when we instead use the fraction of deals by value won by entrants. 18 Consistent IV standard errors are obtained using the procedure derived in Murphy and Topel (1985, Section 5) .
to networking. The effects are again large economically. In Panel B, for instance, a one-standard deviation increase in asymmetric density is associated with a decrease of 3.6 in the number of entrants in state/industry markets (compared to a median of nine). The corresponding effect in Panel C, which focuses on the number of VC entering as lead investors, is 1.5, compared to a median of five. In Panel D, we find that entrants' combined market share is likewise significantly lower in more networked markets, and the economic effect is again quite large. A one-standard deviation increase in network density reduces the fraction of deals lead-managed by entrants by between 10.6% and 12.5% from the unconditional mean, depending on the specification.
Collectively, the results from the market-level entry models shown in Table IV suggest that even after accounting for the endogeneity of networking in the target market, networking by incumbents can present a barrier to entry for potential entrants, and thus may restrict the competitive supply of venture capital to entrepreneurial firms.
IV. Firm-level Analysis
How persuasive the findings of the previous section are depends on how plausible our instruments are judged to be. At minimum, we find evidence of less entry in more networked markets, though this may or may not be causal. We therefore turn to our second approach, which calls for a change of unit of analysis. We ask whether the probability that an individual VC firm successfully enters a market depends on the density of the relationships among market incumbents. This helps break endogeneity problems because while a potential entrant reasonably conditions its entry decision on the entry barriers it faces, the incumbents presumably decide on the optimal level of entry deterrence with a view to minimizing entry overall, not to minimizing the probability of a given individual entrant entering their market.
Focusing on the entry decision of an individual potential entrant also allows us to shed light on how determined entrants can overcome entry barriers. Specifically, we explore whether an entrant can soften the reaction it receives in a market by first establishing ties to one or more of the incumbents in its own home market. We distinguish between the case where potential entrants have previously invited an incumbents to be a participant in a syndicate in their home market (positive outdegree) and the case where a potential entrant was a junior investor in a multi-market incumbent's syndicate in another market (positive indegree). Panels B and C show that investors located closer to a target market and those that have previous industry-related and/or geographic experience are consistently more likely to enter a market than other potential entrants. This mirrors the market-level results of the previous section.
For example, the entry rate among VCs headquartered within 100 miles of the center of the target market is 5.01% in a given year, compared to 1.28% among those located further away.
19
Similarly, the entry rate for potential entrants with both previous industry and state investment experience is 4.42%, compared to 1.21% among other VCs.
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To control for other influences on the entry decision, we estimate firm-level probit models in which the dependent variable equals one if the potential entrant enters the market successfully and zero otherwise. The main variables of interest are the density of incumbents' relationships in the target market and a set of indicators for the variables considered in Table V : Proximity to the market, previous investment experience, and prior ties to incumbents. Other controls include the performance history, investment opportunities, demand variation, market size, overall supply of VC capital, and state economic development measures described in Section II.
The results are reported in Table VI . As before, there are four models, based on two alternative network measures and two alternative market definitions. The models have good overall fit, with pseudo R 2 of around 15%. In each specification, we find that a potential entrant is significantly less likely to enter the more networked the market. This mirrors the main result of the market-level models discussed in Section III, and supports a causal interpretation of the entry-reducing effect of networking.
Who does enter? Prior ties to incumbents have a positive and significant effect on the likelihood of entry in all four models, for both indegree and outdegree. Thus, successful entrants are those who have syndicated with target-market incumbents in other markets. The models include interaction terms crossing indegree and outdegree with the networking measures, and these are each positive and mostly statistically significant. Thus, for entrants with suitable connections, the extent of networking in the target market appears to be irrelevant. To explore this idea more formally, we test the following linear restrictions:
• network measure · (1 + indegree) = 0
• network measure · (1 + outdegree) = 0
• network measure · (1 + outdegree + indegree) = 0
In none of the four models in Table VI are the combined effects significantly negative, suggesting that networking presents a significant barrier to entry only for entrants that lack ties to any incumbent. In fact, entrants with both positive indegree and positive outdegree are actually significantly more likely to enter the more densely networked the market.
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The single most significant determinant of the entry decision in Table VI is location. Depending on specification, VC firms located within 100 miles of the center of the target market are between 128% and 141% more likely to enter than those located farther away. Previous related investment experience, whether in the area or the industry or both, is similarly helpful.
Economically, these effects too are large. For instance, prior experience in the industry and state increases the likelihood of entry by around 1.8 percentage points from the unconditional mean of 1.5%, an increase of around 120%. Prior industry experience in the absence of prior investments in the state has a smaller economic effect, increasing the likelihood of entry by around 36%, while experience in the state but not the industry increases it by 29%. The effects of the remaining control variables largely mirror those found in the market-level analysis.
V. Valuation Effects
Our results support the hypothesis that networking deters at least some entrants. As a result, we expect incumbent VCs to exploit their increased bargaining power by negotiating more favorable funding terms at the expense of entrepreneurs. Because we do not observe any qualitative funding terms (such as control rights, liquidation preferences, anti-dilution protection, and so on), we focus on the valuations at which venture-backed companies raise VC funding.
Companies typically receive funding in distinct stages, which provides VCs with the option to cease funding if a business model turns out not to work. Not surprisingly, the average company's valuation increases over a sequence of funding rounds and with its maturity. It also appears to be related to networking. Sorting state markets into quartiles based on asymmetric density, for instance, the average valuation is $39 million in the most densely networked markets versus $71 million in the least densely networked ones.
These figures do not control for other reasons why valuations might differ. Table VII reports OLS regression results where the unit of analysis is a funding round and the dependent variable is the log of the round valuation. The explanatory variables of interest are the density measures, treated as exogenous to the valuation of each deal in a market in the following year; the lagged fraction of deals entrants won in the company's market the previous year; and an indicator identifying whether the company's lead investor is an entrant (=1) or an incumbent (=0). If entry deterrence is effective, we expect lower valuations in more densely networked markets. Where entrants manage to overcome the entry barriers put in their way, we expect higher valuations.
Finally, entrants likely have to offer higher valuations to compete with incumbents.
Absent data on sales, earnings, or book values in the Venture Economics database, there are no company-specific value drivers we can control for beyond stage of development and funding round number. Following Gompers and Lerner (2000a), we instead control for the book-tomarket ratio of the company's industry (to proxy for investment opportunities), a valuation index of publicly listed companies in the same industry, constructed as in Gompers and Lerner (2000a) , and the amount of money raised in the previous year by VC funds focusing on the company's industry (to capture any "money chasing deals" phenomena). We also include a proxy for the lead investor's investment experience (the log size of assets under management), the lagged number of deals completed in the company's market, an indicator identifying seed-or early-stage companies, a set of funding round dummies (the omitted category is a first-round investment), and market fixed effects to control for otherwise unobserved heterogeneity across markets, such as local pricing anomalies, conditions in the managerial labor market, and so on.
The resulting regressions have excellent fit, in view of the around 40% adjusted R 2 .
Regardless of how we measure it, companies in more densely networked markets are valued significantly less highly, suggesting that incumbent VCs benefit from reduced entry through paying lower prices for their investments. Economically, a one-standard deviation increase in asymmetric or symmetric density is associated with a more than 10% decrease in round valuation from the unconditional mean of $25.6 million, all else equal. On the other hand, the more market share entrants have captured in the recent past, the higher are the valuations paid, suggesting that entry benefits entrepreneurs through higher prices. Also, perhaps not surprisingly, entrants pay significantly higher valuations than do incumbents, all else equal.
The results for the controls mirror those in Gompers and Lerner (2000a) . Higher industry valuations in the public markets are associated with higher valuations being paid in the private markets, while more money chasing deals drives valuations up significantly. Valuations are also higher in more active markets (based on the number of completed deals) and when a more experienced VC leads the round. Early-stage companies receive lower valuations while valuations increase significantly as a company progresses through follow-on funding rounds.
While these results support the notion that entry deterrence has real, detrimental effects for the terms on which entrepreneurs can access the VC market, the Venture Economics valuation data have two shortcomings which could lead to spurious results. First, they are self-reported, and there is every reason to expect companies to disclose valuations strategically; for instance, a company may choose not to disclose a "down-round" valuation (i.e., a discount to the previous round). Indeed, only one fifth of the funding rounds in the VE database disclose valuations.
To correct for strategic disclosure, we follow Hwang, Quigley, and Woodward (2005) who estimate an ordered probit model of seven events at which valuations could be disclosed. 22 The explanatory variables are the company's development status (as per its most recent prior funding round), its VE industry group and location, the stock market capitalization at the time, year effects, and the elapsed time since the most recent funding round, the importance of which is allowed to vary with the type of the previous round (seed, late-stage, and so on). From the ordered probit estimates, they construct the inverse Mill's ratio for each company and round.
We replicate their model in our data and obtain results that are at least as strong as theirs (not shown). When we include the inverse Mill's ratio in the specifications of Table VII , we continue to find that round valuations are lower in more densely networked markets, but increase after entrants have won more market share and if an entrant leads a round. As Panel B of Table VIII shows, all coefficients are highly statistically significant. Compared to the relevant coefficients from the Table VII The second shortcoming of the VE valuation data is the absence of company-level data on value drivers. No doubt our valuation models leave out many factors that influence valuations, such as the company's track record, the quality of management, or the strength of intellectual property. However, we can exploit the panel structure of the data -companies receive multiple funding rounds -to remove the effect of unobserved company-specific factors. We do so while continuing to control for unobserved market-specific factors that might bear on valuation. The resulting model is a mixed linear model with two levels of random effects (for the company and for the market), which can be estimated using maximum residual likelihood; see Baltagi, Song, and Jung (2001) . The coefficients of interest are reported in Panel C of Our final models, shown in Panel D, adjust for both selective disclosure and unobserved company-level heterogeneity by including the inverse Mill's ratios in the mixed effects model.
While this reduces the coefficient estimates for the networking a bit further, our conclusions remain unaffected. Thus, the effects of networking and entry on company valuations do not appear to be an artifact of well-known problems with the VE valuation data.
VI. Conclusion
We examine whether U.S. VC firms engage in a form of tacit collusion that restricts entry into local VC markets, in order to improve their bargaining power over entrepreneurs. We expect more densely networked markets to be harder to enter, not only because of the relatively greater network externalities that incumbents enjoy in such markets, but also because withdrawal of network access may provide an effective threat of punishment against incumbents who cooperate with new entrants.
We provide evidence that markets in which incumbents maintain dense syndication networks with each other are indeed associated with reduced entry, controlling for a wide variety of other influences that bear on entry. Moreover, evidence derived from plausible instruments for networking suggests that prevailing network conditions in a target market causally influence entry decisions. The magnitude of these effects is economically large, and robust to a wide range of specifications.
One way to overcome this particular barrier to entry is through establishing ties to the incumbents in other markets, i.e., by "joining the club." The price of admission appears to be letting incumbents in on the entrant's deal flow in unrelated markets. In addition, previous investment experience in the targeted industry or a prior presence in the targeted geographic area facilitates entry. However, entrants also appear to enter by offering to pay higher prices.
Having established a link between syndication networks and reduced entry, we ask whether incumbents' bargaining power vis-à-vis entrepreneurs increases. We show that the valuations at which companies can raise VC funding depend on the extent of networking and the degree of entry that results, consistent with networking providing an effective barrier to entry. Our results are consistent with the hypothesis that incumbents engage in strategic behavior that reduces entry and benefit from doing so through paying lower prices for their investments.
Our findings illustrate the role of networking as an entry deterrent. While we focus on the VC setting, we believe our findings generalize to other industries that make heavy use of networks, such as investment banking. In addition, they help explain prior empirical evidence that better networked VCs enjoy better performance (see Hochberg, Ljungqvist, and Lu (2007) ).
Our work also sheds light on the process of entry. Successful entry appears to involve "joining the club" by offering the incumbents syndication opportunities in one's home market. Finally, our findings present interesting policy implications. If networking poses an effective barrier to entry, this may lead to a more restricted supply of capital to entrepreneurial ventures and to harsher funding terms. The structure of the local VC market therefore has significant implications for entrepreneurial ventures seeking startup capital. More broadly, we may ask how strategic behavior in the VC market affects the funding of new ventures and their eventual success.
Figure 1. Example of a Densely Networked Market
The figure shows the network that arises from syndication of portfolio company investments in the market for computer-related ventures in Michigan over the five-year window 1979-1983. Nodes on the graph represent VC firms, and arrows represent syndicate ties between them. The direction of the arrow represents the lead/non-lead relationship between syndicate members. The arrow points from the VC leading the syndicate to the non-lead member. Two-directional arrows indicate that both VCs on the arrow have at one point in the time window led a syndicate in which the other was a non-lead member.
Figure 2. Example of a Sparsely Networked Market
The figure shows the network that arises from syndication of portfolio company investments in the market for nonhigh-tech ventures in Pennsylvania over the five-year window 1990-1994. Table I . Descriptive Sample Statistics.
The unit of observation in this table is a market-year. We define a market as a combination of one of the six Venture Economics industries and either a U.S. state or a Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA). Venture Economics classifies investments into the following industries: Biotechnology; communications and media; computer related; medical/health/life science; semiconductors/other electronics; and non-high-technology. To qualify for inclusion in the sample, a market-year has to have a minimum of 25 investments in the prior five years and five investments in the current year. There are 129 distinct state markets and 130 distinct MSA markets. Under each definition, there are between one and 24 annual observations for each market, resulting in 1,364 state-market-years and 1,268 MSAmarket-years. Entrants in Panel A are defined as VC firms investing in a given market in year t that had never invested in this market before year t. For a market in year t, we use data from the previous five years (from t-5 to t-1) to construct four network measures. Density in Panel B is defined as the proportion of all logically possible ties among incumbents that are present in that market. Asymmetric density is calculated from directed networks (i.e., conditioning on lead vs. syndicate participant ties) and symmetric density is calculated from undirected networks. Panel C characterizes the markets. To control for performance in a market, and in the absence of return data, we calculate the fraction of venture-backed firms in a market that were successfully exited through an IPO or an M&A transaction during the prior five years. To measure excess performance in a market, we subtract from this the median exit rate across all geographic markets in the same Venture Economics industry. B/M is the value-weighted book/market ratio of public companies in the relevant industry. We map public-market B/M ratios to industries based on four-digit SIC codes. The VC inflows variable is the aggregate amount of capital raised by VC funds specializing in the industry. We take a fund's industry specialization to be the Venture Economics industry that accounts for the largest share of its portfolio, based on dollars invested. Potential entrants in Panel D are defined as the VC firms satisfying the following three conditions: (1) the firm was founded (i.e., raised its first fund) in or before year t; (2) the firm has at least one fund under management that was raised in the previous six years; and (3) the firm has not invested in this particular market prior to year t. We use trailing five-year windows to construct the characteristics of potential entrants. A potential entrant VC firm's indegree is the normalized number of unique VCs in the market in question that have led syndicates the firm was a non-lead member of. A potential entrant VC firm's outdegree is the normalized number of unique VCs in the market that have participated as non-lead investors in syndicates lead-managed by the firm. (The lead investor is identified as the VC firm that invests the largest amount in the portfolio company in a given round.) , and * to denote significance at the 0.1%, 1%, and 5% level, respectively. In the two specifications where markets are defined as state/industry pairs, the number of distinct markets is 129 and the number of observations (market-years) is 1,364. In the two specifications where markets are defined as MSA/industry pairs, the number of markets is 130 and the number of observations is 1,268. The models are estimated using OLS with fixed (market) effects. The motivation for our two instruments can be found in the text. Following Coval and Moskowitz (1999) , we measure the distance between portfolio companies in terms of the average distance in miles between every pair of portfolio companies in the market, using companies' zip codes to pinpoint location. All control variables are defined as in Table I , and * to denote significance at the 0.1%, 1%, and 5% level (two-sided), respectively. In the two specifications where markets are defined as state/industry pairs, the number of distinct markets is 129 and the number of observations (marketyears) is 1,364. In the two specifications where markets are defined as MSA/industry pairs, the number of markets is 130 and the number of observations is 1,268. The difference is due to the fact that we filter out markets with little activity. Table III . We treat the network measures as endogenous and replace them with the predicted values generated from the regressions shown in Table II . The dependent variables in Panels A, B, and C are the number of deals won by VC firms entering a market in year t, the number of VC firms entering a market in year t, and the number of VC firms entering a market that lead-manage syndicates in year t, respectively. Given the count nature of these dependent variables, and the fact that we have repeated observations per market, the models in Panels A-C are estimated using conditional fixed-effects Poisson. The dependent variable in Panel D is the fraction of deals by number lead-managed by entrants in a market in year t. This dependent variable has support on [0,1] and positive mass at both 0 and 1. To avoid the resulting well-known biases of OLS in this situation, we estimate fractional logit models using quasi-MLE; see Papke and Wooldridge (1996) . This involves modeling the conditional mean E(y|x)=exp(xβ)/(1+exp(xβ)). Note that fractional logits cannot currently accommodate fixed effects. Thus, we pool repeated observations on each market in Panel D. To save space, we report only the coefficient estimates for the network measures; the coefficient estimates for the controls mirror those shown in Table II . Standard errors, shown in italics, are based on the Murphy-Topel (1985) adjustment. We use *** , **
, and * to denote significance at the 0.1%, 1%, and 5% level (two-sided), respectively. In the specifications where markets are defined as state/industry pairs, the number of distinct markets is 129 and the number of observations (market-years) is 1,364. In the specifications where markets are defined as MSA/industry pairs, the number of markets is 130 and the number of observations is 1,268. The difference is due to the fact that we filter out markets with little activity. The unit of observation is a funding round and the dependent variable is the log of the valuation put on the company in that round. To save space, we report only the coefficient estimates of interest; the coefficient estimates for the controls mirror those shown in Table VII . Panel A is the OLS with market fixed effects specification taken from 
